ټول حقوق د منډيګک بنسټ سره محفوظ دي
178 years ago today (July 23, 1839), during the First Anglo Afghan War (1839-1842) a nearly 21,000 strong British expeditionary force attacked the 2500-3000 defenders of Ghazni that had blocked their advance to Kabul. Earlier, on the hot summer day of July 18, as the Army of the Indus marching from Kandahar, reached within two days march of Ghazni, its columns were stretched over tens of miles along the dusty highway. The army needed to close up for a battle against the walled city of Ghazni. It took two days of forced marches to consolidate the force. The army initially camped on the southwest side of the city where it was exposed to cannon fire from the ramparts. The British moved their camp out of the defender’s artillery range using a seven-mile circuitous route across the hills to the Kabul side of the city. The new location also blocked the expected approach route of Amir Dost Mohammad from Kabul.
The British discovered that the fortifications of Ghazni were much stronger than expected. Situated on high ground, the city was surrounded by a 60-70 foot high wall with a moat in front of it. Since the British army left its siege trains and artillery in Kandahar, these obstacles were insurmountable using the available field guns. Nor was there much prospect of quickly reducing the fortification by scaling the walls or mining under them. Laying siege to the city until the siege artillery would arrive from Kandahar would give Amir Dost Mohammad more time to counter the invasion. Shah Shuja, eager to reach Kabul as soon as possible and claim his ancestral throne, advised Keane to seal off the city, bypass it and move on to Kabul. But Keane was keen to remove this threat to the rear of his forces and to secure his line of communication. The only other way was to blow open a city gate with explosives and take the city with a surprise attack.
A prominent deserter from the garrison, who had joined the British camp as it approach the city, offered the British command the most-valuable information about the weak points in the fortifications. He reported that while all gates of the city were bricked up, the Kabul gate was not and could be blown-in with gunpowder. The deserter was none other than a first nephew of Amir Dost Mohammad named Sardar Abdul Rashid.
افغان جزایل توپک:د افغان انګليس لومړۍ، دوهمي او درېمې جګړو کي يوازېنى شى چي د انګريزانو خوب يې تښتولى و جزائل ټوپک وو، چي افغانانو پخپله جوړول. انګليس تاريخ ليکونکي وابرېټ د مکناټن له قوله د هغه مشهوره خبره ليکي: "افغانان به له جګړو ستړي نه سي او جزائل له ډزو…".کابو دوه سوه کاله د مخه زموږ نيکونو د دښمن مقابله په خپل لاس جوړو کړيو ټوپکونو (جزائل ) باندي کوله چي زيات يې دکابل په اهنګر خانه کې جوړيدل او يو شمېر نور بيا په مختلفو ډولونو او شکلونو د هېواد په نورو برخو کي جوړېدل چي دې ټوپکونو طبيعتاً د افغانانو د بدني جوړښت سره سمون درلود چي اوږده، ظريف رسا نخښه ويشتونکي، ساده او په عين حال کي خطر ناک وه.دا امریکایی یې د افغانانو شاعرانه توب ته نغوته کوي، چي څنګه یې په ټوپک نقاشۍ کړي او ښایسته کړی یې دی. قبضه یا کنداغ یې د هغه وخت تر عادي ټوپکو اوږد دی، چي دا ټکی یې هم ده ته جالب دی. دغه انګرېز په خپلو ټولو ویډیوګانو کي د پاکستاني وسله پلورونکیو له جعل څخه شکایت کوي چي تل تاریخي جعلي وسلو په بڼه وسلې جوړوي او په ټوریسټانو یې د انتیک په نامه پلوري خو وایي چې دا ټوپک هغه رنګ نه وی.••• ═══ ༻✿༺═══ •••? ويډيو ترتيب او اوډنه:Forgotten Weapons◀️د نورو ورته ويډيوګانو د پاره زموږ يوټيوب: https://bit.ly/33Ba4Fl#منډيګک_تاريخي_بنسټ زموږ پاڼه:☚ mundigak.com
Geplaatst door Mundigak Historical videos op Zaterdag 13 juni 2020
Preparations for blowing up the Kabul Gate and storming the fortress began on July 22. Artillery was positioned to cover the approach of the light companies of the three British regiments (3rd, 13th and 17th Foot) and from the one Bengal European regiment formed into a storming party commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dennie of the 13th Foot. The remainder of the three British regiments formed the main attack column which was commanded by Brigadier Sale. The 16 Bengal Native Infantry Regiment was to make a diversionary attack against the Bazar Gate opening to the south. Three other regiments of Native Infantry formed the reserve under General Cotton. High winds prevented the garrison from detecting the preparations for the attack. The moon set at half past ten and the overcast was gloomy and mysterious. “The night of the 22nd was dark,” wrote Lieutenant Durand (later Major General Sir Henry Durand) who commanded the demolition party, “and a few drops at one time threatened rain, but none fell. At midnight the batteries of artillery moved from camp, and were gradually put into position at about 400 yards’ distance from the ramparts. The enemy, so alert on the previous night when they expected the attack, took no notice of the rumble of the artillery, and suffered it to occupy its ground without molestation.”
Around 3:00 a.m. on the 23rd, while the artillery was setting up positions on the high ground to the right of the Kabul Gate, a party of engineers commanded by Captain Peat of the Bombay Sappers and Miners moved to the gate. Durand commanding the explosion party recalls “the morning star was high in the heavens, and the first red streak of approaching morning was on the horizon, when the explosion party stepped forward to its duty led by the engineer Durand, they advanced to within 150 yards of the work’ when a challenge from the walls, a shot, and a shout, told that the party was discovered. Instantly the garrison was on the alert; their musketry rang free and quick from the ramparts, and blue lights suddenly glared on the top of the battlement, brilliantly illuminating the approach to the gate.”
Peat’s party rushed forward to the wall and Durand’s men placed 300 pounds of powder bags against the gate and unrolled a length of quick-match fuse. The explosion blew-in the gate. Dennie’s four light companies rushed through the shattered gate and met the Afghan defenders in a ferocious hand-to-hand fight in the semi-dark of the gate tunnel. Dennie was supposed to occupy the ramparts on both sides of the gateway in order to secure that key point. Instead he pushed on into the town under the pressure of heavy musketry fire. The situation created a gap between the rear of the storming party and the head of the advance column under Sale. This gap was exploited by the Afghans who launched a counterattack that separated the Dennie and Sale forces. The fierce fighting continued during which Afghan swordsmen dropped boldly down from the ramparts and fell, sword in hand, upon the leading elements of the Sale column. The narrow passage at the gate was overcrowded as two sides struggled hand-to-hand.
Brigadier Sale himself was struck down by a saber cut to the face. During a desperate struggle with his opponent, Sale sliced his hand on the Afghan’s sword. When Major Kershaw saw the Brigadier’s struggle for his life, he rushed to his rescue and ran the Afghan through but the tough tribesman continued to fight until Sale split his adversary’s skull with his sabre. The commander stood up again, issued his orders and his main column was soon within the fortress. The supporting column, under Colonel Croker, then pushed forward and the reserve followed in due course. The column cut its way through the gate into the streets beyond. The Afghan garrison, numbering 2500, fought with unexpected energy. Reportedly, almost all the dead were pierced by the bayonet, and very few received gun-shot wounds. Afghan sources claim that the British troops were thrown back from the gate several times before they overwhelmed the limited number of Afghan swordsmen. Sita Ram states that some European companies were driven back and two companies of Sepoys charged and carried the gateway. The citadel was undefended and the city was in British hands by sunrise as the colors of the 13th and 17th regiments fluttered in the strong morning breeze on the ramparts of the Ghazni citadel. British casualties were 200 killed and wounded while the Afghans lost 500 killed and 1,600 prisoners. The number of Afghan wounded is not known.
With the end of the fighting, Sardar Haidar Khan was taken prisoner. Shah Shuja wished to put him to death but the British persuaded him to change his decision. The prince and his family were treated respectfully and, according to Mohan Lal, the royal prisoner was appreciative of the way he was accommodated by the British. But, this did not stop him from showing his opposition to the invasion of his country. When the Sardar met General Keane he spoke bluntly saying that he was fighting for his country and his Amir; and the Afghans never annoyed the British, why therefore, had they come into his country to set up a king whom they all hated. “Kill me if you like” he told the General, “but if you let me go, I shall ever be found as your enemy and all in my power to excite the people against you and drive you all out of Kabul.” After a one-week’s stay in Ghazni, Keane marched out of Ghazni towards Kabul on 30th July 1839. He left a garrison behind consisting of one native infantry regiment, some artillery and the sick and wounded.
(Summary excerpts from Ali A. Jalali’s “a Military History of Afghanistan from the Great Game to the Global War on Terror, University Press of Kansas, 2017”
 Lieutenant Holdsworth letter to father, July 124, 1839 at Ghazni, The First Afghan War 1839-1842, Dispatches from the Front Line, Ed. J.B. Gardner, Parchment Publishing Ltd. London 2012, p. 64
 Captain Henry Havelock, Narrative of the War in Afghanistan 1838—39, vol. 2. Henry Colburn Publishers, London 1840, pp. 64-66
 This gate today is locally called “Darwaza-i- Bahlol” or the Bahlol gate for its proximity to the shrine of an ancient saint named Bahlol
 Durand, Henry Marion, the First Afghan War and Its Causes, London, Longmans, Green and Co. 1879, p. 177
 Ibid, p. 178
 Captain Havelock, who served as aide de camp to General Cotton and participated in the battle provides vivid details of the struggle of Sale with the Afghan fighter. Captain Havelock, who served as aide de camp to General Cotton and participated in the battle provides vivid details of the struggle of Sale with the Afghan fighter… He wrote: “One of their (Afghans) number rushing over the fallen timbers, brought down Brigadier Sale by a cut in the face with his sharp Shamshir (saber). The Afghan repeated his blow as his opponent was falling; but the pummel not the edge of his sword, this time took effect, though with stunning violence. He lost his footing, however, in the effort, and Briton and Afghan rolled together amongst the fractured timbers. Thus situated the first care of the Brigadier was to master the weapon of his adversary. He snatched at it, but one of his fingers met the edge of the trenchant blade. He quickly withdrew his wounded hand, and adroitly replaced over that of his adversary, so as to keep fast the hilt of his Shamshir. But he had an active and powerful opponent, and was himself faint from the loss of blood. Captain Kershaw, of the 13th, aide-de-camp to Brigadier Baumgardt, happened in the melee to approach the scene of conflict; the wounded leader recognized and called to him for aid. Kershaw passed his sabre through the body of the Afghan; but still the desperado continued to struggle with frantic violence. At length, in the fierce grapple, the Brigadier for a moment got uppermost. Still retaining the weapon of his enemy in his left hand, he dealt him with his right a cut from his own sabre, which cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. The Mohammadan once shouted, Ue Ullah (Oh! God!) And never moved or spoke again.”
See Captain Henry Havelock, Narrative of the War in Afghanistan 1838—39, Vol. II. Henry Colburn Publishers, London 1840, pp. 79-80
 Ferrier, Joseph, The History of the Afghans, translated into English by William Jesse, John Murray, London 1858, P. 329
 Shikarpuri, Munshi Atta Mohammad, Tazah Nawa-ye Ma’arek, Sindh Adabi Board Publisher, Karachi 1959, PP. 395-396
 Sita Ram, From Sepoy to Subehdar, Edited by James Lunt, first English edition 1873, published in India by Vikas Publication, Delhi 1970, P. 98
 Mohan Lal, Life of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan of Kabul, 2 volumes, Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, London 1846, vol. 2, pp. 229-230
 Sita Ram, P. 99