First Anglo-Afghan War

On November 2, 1841, in the closing phase of the First Anglo-Afghan War, Kabul was shaken early in the morning by the news of a popular outbreak that targeted the British envoy Alexander Burnes’ house inside the city. The shops throughout the winding streets of the capital were all closed when an increasing number of people surrounded the British Ilchi’s residence. Burnes attempted to calm the throng while addressing them from the window of his upper room. Unmoved by Burnes’ efforts, the excited crowd, some having ascended to the roofs of adjacent buildings launched attacks on the British residence around 8 o’clock and killed Sir Alexander Burnes, his brother Lieutenant Burnes and Captain William Breadroot. They were all cut to pieces as were their guards. The mob then sacked Captain Johnson’s treasury which was kept in the neighboring house. It contained some 17,000 pounds. Flames and smoke billowed from the attack scene and sounds of musket fire were heard throughout the city.

The mob that surrounded Alexander Burnes’ house was initially a small crowd which gradually swelled and spread to the whole city. Mohan Lal whose residence was separated by a few buildings from Burnes’ related the story in detail. He said that initially a small body of men surrounded the house which speedily increased. According to him, Alexander Burnes earlier had turned down the offer of Shah Shuja’s Vizier, Osman Khan, to escort him to the safety of Bala Hissar. But later he had sent a note to the Envoy requesting assistance which never came. Burnes messages for talks with the principle leaders of the insurrection including, Abdullah Khan Achakzai, Aminullah Khan Logari, Sikandar Khan and Abdul Salam Khan (who were on the scene), were rejected. Instead they ordered their men to ascend to the tops of the neighboring houses and to penetrate the garden attached to the residency and to open fire on the British compound. The rebels set fire to the house and the flames extended to the room where Sir Alexander and his brother were standing. Lieutenant Charles Burnes then came out into the garden and was cut to pieces. Seeing that Charles was slain and the fire had consumed the whole of the house, Alexander Burnes stepped out of the door into the garden pleading with the mob to save his life, but in one minute he was cut to pieces by the furious mob.

Many commentators claim that the uprising was a spontaneous event that later expanded to an enormous proportion. But given the events that led to the outbreak, the attack on Burnes’ residence was the first act of a bloody drama which had simmered for over two years. Riding a wave of political, administrative, economic and socio-cultural resentment among the populace, influential tribal leaders and political elite mobilized the people for a revolt that spread like a brush fire across the country and never subsided until after the complete withdrawal of the occupying army. The rising of November 2nd was deliberately planned and Sir Alexander Burnes was warned by his intelligence the night before of the impending storm. He dismissed it as an ‘incredible report.’ On the eve of the insurrection, Lady Sale noted the arrival of many horsemen in Kabul from Kohistan.

The weakening of the British force with the departure of Sale brigade, the uprising of the Ghilzais and growing disturbances in Kohistan created an opportune moment to initiate the insurrection planned by the resistance leaders. The two major figures at the forefront of the revolt were Abdullah Khan Achakzai and Mir Masjidi Khan of Kohistan. Both were staunch anti-British activists. British sources claim that Abdullah Khan had spread rumors that several of the chiefs would be arrested and sent in exile to London. He is said to have forged an order from Shah Shuja to “kill the infidels” in Jihad against the occupiers. A passage in a posthumous memorandum by the Envoy, which was in Lady Macnaghten’s possession, asserted that “the immediate cause of the outbreak in the capital was a seditious letter addressed by Abdullah Khan to several chiefs of influence at Cabul (Kabul), stating that it was the design of the Envoy to seize and send them all to London! The principal rebels met on the previous night, and, relying on the inflammable feelings of the people of Cabul (Kabul), they pretended that the king had issued an order to put all infidels to death; having previously forged an order from him for our destruction, by the common process of washing out the contents of a genuine paper, with the exception of the seal, and substituting their own wicked inventions.”

Contemporary Afghan accounts, however, indicate that the threat of sending of hostile Afghan leaders into exile was real and made by the Envoy in a letter produced by Shah Shuja’s Vizier, Osman Khan Nizam-u-Dawlah, on behalf of the Envoy calling for five Durrani chiefs including Abdullah Khan Achakzai, Ghulam Ahmad Khan, Mohammad Atta Khan Bamizai, Sardar Sekandar Khan and Abdul Salam Khan Bamizai to be banished to Peshawar after a three day notice. He asked Shah Shuja for approval. The Shah objected to the plan after the chiefs appealed to him to block the brutal design. With Macnaghten’s insistence, however, the Shah eventually yielded. Consequently it is certain that the chiefs had met before the November 2nd and planned the uprising, which opened a long period of violence across the occupied land.

One year earlier November 2, 1840, marked the final military encounter of the deposed but defiant Afghan ruler Amir Dost Mohammad Khan with the British expeditionary forces in Parwan. That day, an ominous day in the annals of the English in Afghanistan commemorating the anti-British bloody uprising in Kabul in 1841, the British force at last came in sight of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan’s army. It was positioned in the valley of Parwan, which stretches from the Hindu Kush in the north to the Ghorband River and Charikar to the south centered in modern day Jabal Seraj, about 50 miles north of Kabul. The town is located on high ground overlooking the lush plain of Parwan lying between the Nejrao Mountains and the fields of Gul-Bahar and Jabal Seraj. Although the Nejrao hills teemed with armed crowds, the Amir did not seem prepared for combat that day. An unexpected movement precipitated the collision. On the first appearance of the British troops the Amir evacuated the village of Jabal Seraj and the neighboring forts; and was moving off to a position on some elevated ground commanded by a steep hill to his rear. A British officer on the battlefield, Dr. Lord, suggested that the British cavalry move forward to outflank the Afghan horse.

William Kaye, the British chronicler of the First Anglo-Afghan War, describes the day colorfully. “What followed is one of the most exciting, as it is one of the most melancholy incidents of the Afghan war,” he wrote. “It was a clear bright morning. The yellow foliage of autumn glittered like gold in the broad sunlight. The opposite hills were alive with the enemy. The crisp fresh air, so bracing and invigorating to the human frame, seemed to breathe confidence and courage. Dost Mohammad, who, since his defeat at Bamian, had been often heard of, but never seen, by the British troops, and who seemed to elude the grasp of the Army of Occupation like an ignis fatuus, was now actually within their reach. It ought to have been an hour of triumph. It was one of humiliation. The Afghans were on the hills skirting one side of the pass; the British troops were on the opposite declivity. Dost Mohammad saw our cavalry advancing, and from that moment cast behind him all thought of retreat. At the head of a small band of horsemen, strong, sturdy Afghans, but badly mounted, he prepared to meet his assailants. Beside him rode the bearer of the blue standard which marked his place in the battle. He pointed to it; reined in his horse; then snatching the white lunghi (turban) from his head, stood up in his stirrups uncovered before his followers, and called upon them, in the name of God and the Prophet, to drive the cursed Kaffirs from the country of the faithful. “Follow me,” he cried aloud, or I am a lost man. Slowly, but steadily, the Afghan horsemen advanced. The English officers, who led our cavalry to the attack, covered themselves with glory. The native troopers fled like sheep. Emboldened by the craven conduct of the British cavalry, the Afghan horsemen rode forward, driving their enemy before them, and charging right up to the position of the British, until almost within reach of our guns.” The Afghans dominated the field for a while and then quietly withdrew from the scene of the battle.

The British campaign in Kohistan, like everywhere else, was more than a purely military operation. It was significantly augmented by political, financial and psychological elements aimed at winning local support, reducing the Amir’s army’s popular backing and creating mistrust and suspicion within the ranks of the Afghan resistance. Gold was often more effective than sabers and bayonets. Mohan Lal later wrote that “Sir Alexander Burnes and myself were actively engaged in detaching from him (Amir) as much as we could the number of adherents. The rumors of our distributing money amongst the people in order to prevent their junction with the Amir, had circulated amongst his followers, and he appeared distrustful of their fidelity, and feared that they might seize or destroy his power in the hope of receiving a reward from us.” According to one contemporary Afghan source, just before the battle of Parwan, the Amir narrowly escaped a trap set by a local chief, Abdul Sobhan Khan. The chief had hosted the Amir in his fort (qalla) and secretly sent his brother to Brigadier Sale to report the Amir’s location in the hope of winning the 200,000 rupees prize placed on the Amir’s head. But Dost Mohammad was alerted in time and fled with his small party into the mountains.

Meanwhile, Amir Dost Mohammad, in the very hour of victory, felt that it was hopeless to contend against the power of the British Government. Some Afghan sources claim that he intended to move to Zurmat and join the rebellious Ghilzai tribesmen of Ghazni. But as he was heading south with a small party, he changed his mind during a halt at Pay-i-Munar (just north of today’s Kabul Airport). Since his family was in Ghazni under British protection, the Amir decided to bow to his fate and submit himself to the protection of his enemies. A day after his spectacular victory in Parwan, the wandering monarch, who was more than 24 hours in the saddle, unexpectedly appeared in Kabul and stumbled on the British Envoy as he was returning from his evening ride near the Bala Hissar fortress. Amir’s attendant galloped forward to the Envoy and reported to him that the Amir was at hand. “What Amir?” asked Macnaghten. “Dost Mohammad Khan,” was the answer. Astonished by the response he anxiously queried “with or without army?” At this point the Amir himself stood before him. Dismounting himself from his horse, Dost Mohammad surrendered his sword to the Envoy, but Macnaghten returned it to him with respect and asked the Amir to remount. They then rode together into the Mission compound. The gallant Afghan Amir was treated with honor not only by the Envoy but also by the British officers who paid him all kind of attention. Macnaghten later wrote “Shah Shuja had no claim upon us. We had no hand in depriving him of his kingdom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim”

(Excerpts from A. A. Jalali’s “A Military History of Afghanistan from the Great Game to the Global War on Terror”)