The End of Soviet Occupation

Today (February 15) marks the 29th anniversary of the withdrawal of the last Soviet soldier from Afghanistan following a period of more than nine years of occupation. The historical departure of the occupying force came in the wake of the Soviet military defeat and its failure to achieve a political settlement of the war.

Official documents at the Main Operations Department of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff indicate that by the end of February 1980, the Soviet leadership assumed that the new Afghan regime under Babrak Karmal had been well-established and was contemplating the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The plan was, however, postponed indefinitely for a number of reasons. At that time, they believed that the withdrawal would indicate submission to pressure from the Western-backed Afghan Mujahedin forces, thus damaging the image of the Soviet Union while strengthening the position of the United States and other Western countries in the region. Further, many believed that an early withdrawal was a risk leading to further destabilization of the situation in Afghanistan which could resulted in the loss of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union and the rapid growth of Muslim extremism near the borders of the Soviet Union.[1] The alternative for the Soviet forces was getting heavily engaged in fighting with the Afghan resistance that began in March 1980 with their operations in the Kunar Province and lasted for another nine years – a war which Soviet authors and many Western analysts claim initially did not figure in the USSR plans at all.[2] What is obvious, the strength of the resistance in Afghanistan and the weakness and unpopularity of the Soviet–installed government in Kabul soon dashed the Soviet leadership hopes for a short military involvement in Afghanistan.

In the next several years while the war intensified and the Soviets were losing ground to the Mujahedin, rapid changes of leadership in the Soviet Union caused by the death of Secretary Generals in relatively short intervals delayed any concrete decision on ending the war. Brezhnev is said to have indicated interest in finding a way to withdraw from Afghanistan as early as May 1980.[3] His successor Yuri Andropov, one of the staunch proponents of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, and his KGB colleagues, blamed foreign powers particularly the United States and Pakistan for arming the Mujahedin which they believed was the cause of the Soviet setbacks in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, by spring 1983, Andropov privately accepted the need for a settlement which fell well short of a Soviet military victory. He told the UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar that the war was damaging the Soviet Union’s relations with the West, “socialist states,” Islamic states and the rest of the Third World as well as its internal social and economic development.[4] However, he told the Politburo in March 1983 “we are fighting against American imperialism…That’s why we cannot back off.”[5]

Meanwhile, the U.N-sponsored indirect talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva, known as proximity talks, that began in 1982 and continued for several years with slow progress, became the forum aimed at bringing a peaceful resolution of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The ailing Andropov died in January 1984 and his successor Konstantin Chernenko could barely begin deciding on the Afghan war before he died in March 1985. The accession of his successor Mikhail Gorbachev to power marked the turning point in the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, when the situation had become a stalemate. This also coincided with the rise of new thinking in the Soviet military theory spearheaded by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the Chief of the Soviet Army General Staff. Known as technological revolution in war or the introduction of a new generation of warfare, the new theory implied that the advent of high technology based on information technology had introduced revolutionary changes in the conduct of modern warfare making conventional non-nuclear war unprecedentedly effective and destructive. In his widely circulated 1982 treatise “Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland,” and other writings, Ogarkov called for new conventional technology. He argued that the emergence of “new means of armed combat requires the improvement of existing forms of combat action…,” and that “bold experiments and solutions are necessary, even if this means discarding obsolete traditions, views, and propositions.”[6]

The Soviet Union could hardly introduce such revolutionary change into its military doctrine unless it caught up with the high technological advances in the West, particularly in the United States, and unless it made major shifts in its economic and political policies which later became the likely impetus for Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika. The shifts of Moscow’s policy toward Afghanistan should be seen in this context. In an interview in March 1983, Ogarkov told an American Journalist, Leslie Gelb of the New York Times, that “numbers of troops and weapons means little,” he said, “We cannot equal the quality of U.S. arms for a generation or two. Modern military power is based upon technology and technology is based on computers.” In Moscow, unlike Washington “we don’t have computers in every office of the Defense Ministry.” Ogarkov went on to insist “we will never be able to catch up with you in modern arms until we have an economic revolution. And the question is whether we can have an economic revolution without a political revolution.”[7] It was in such an internal and external context, coupled with the Soviet’s failure to win militarily in Afghanistan that Gorbachev looked for different ways to deal with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. He later wrote “on taking office as General Secretary in 1985 I was immediately faced with an avalanche of problems…We needed to withdraw from the damaging and costly war in Afghanistan.”[8] At the Politburo on 17 October 1985, Gorbachev told his colleagues that it was time to come to “a decision on Afghanistan” meaning to find a way of bringing the war to an end. In spite of his firm desire to withdraw from Afghanistan, however, Gorbachev gave his forces a last chance to defeat the Mujahedin militarily. Robert Gates, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence wrote “we saw new, more aggressive Soviet tactics, a spread of the war to the eastern provinces, attacks inside Pakistan and the more indiscriminate use of air power. These 18 months were the bloodiest of the war.”[9] Afterwards, at the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in February 1986 Gorbachev described the war in Afghanistan “a bleeding wound.”

As part of his efforts to Afghanize the military conflict, Gorbachev saw the need for a change of the guard in Kabul to make the Moscow-backed government more effective and reform-oriented. By the spring of 1986, Gorbachev had decided on the replacement of Babrak Karmal as Afghan leader by the much tougher but also more flexible head of the KHAD Najibullah who had the strong backing of the KGB. Early in May, Gorbachev bluntly told Karmal that he should hand over power to Najibullah and retire to Moscow with his family. There followed what Anatoly Dobrynin, the only other person present, described as a ‘painful” scene in which Karmal “obsequiously begged Gorbachev to change his mind, promising to perform his duties in a more correct and active way.”[10] Gorbachev refused and Kabul radio announced that PDPA Central Committee accepted Babrak Karmal’s request to resign for “health reasons” and elected Najibullah to the post. Karmal was given the ceremonial position of President of the Revolutionary Council. Later, Karmal’s reluctance to cooperate led to his forced resignation from that post as well as from the membership in the Afghan Politburo.

A few months later, the fate of the Soviet war in Afghanistan was decided at the Soviet Politburo meeting of November 13, 1986. “We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years already,” said Gorbachev, “unless we change our approach, we shall continue to fight for another 20-30 years…Our military should be told they are learning badly from this war…Are we going to fight endlessly, as a testimony that our troops are not able to deal with the situation? We need to finish  as quickly as possible.”[11] Gorbachev gave it two years to withdraw all Soviet troops under the conditions that it did not result in the Americans getting into the country. The transition time was aimed at preparing for a responsible pullout and ensuring that proper arrangements were in place for putting a good face on an apparent failure after a long war, particularly to save face vis-à-vis the West and the Third World states. These measures included reaching a peace agreement in the context of the U.N-led Geneva proximity talks; preparing the DRA to broaden the base of the government by including non-party and traditional figures and groups through a national reconciliation drive; to moderate government policies and de-ideologize the ruling party and reach out to leaders of the armed opposition and the neighbors; and finally to build up the capacity of the DRA army to withstand the post-Soviet security threats.

The political decision by Gorbachev to withdraw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan invigorated the Geneva process after years of slow progress. A settlement was reached on April 14, 1988 between the Afghanistan government and Pakistan with the United States and the Soviet Union signing as guarantors. The accords consisted of several instruments on bilateral relations including non-interference and non-intervention in each other affairs and not allowing their territories to be used against each other’s sovereignty and stability. The Afghan Mujahedin were not party to the Geneva accords but it was assumed that Pakistan and the United States were representing the interests of the Afghan resistance. This gave political weight to Pakistan in the Geneva process. Iran refused to participate in the Geneva negotiations on the grounds that the Afghan resistance was not represented. However, Iran agreed to be briefed by the U.N. mediator on the progress of the talks. The accord also stipulated a phased withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan between May 15, 1988 and February 15, 1989.[12] A bi-lateral agreement on the voluntary return of refugees was signed between the DRA and Pakistan. The agreement did not include Iran despite the fact that there were about 2.35 million Afghan refugees in Iran.[13] Mujahedin exclusion caused them to refuse to accept the terms of the agreement paving the way for continuation of the war following the Soviet pullout.

In Afghanistan, Najibullah launched an ambitious program in December 1986 including a call for a ceasefire, return of the Afghans from exile and holding talks with Mujahedin leaders to discuss the possibilities of forming a coalition government. He also sent feelers and emissaries to former Afghan King Zahir Shah in Rome to return and lead a national process of peace and reconciliation in the country. In order to offer tangible signs of moving away from the dominance of the Communist party, Najibullah changed the constitution by convening a Loya Jirga in November 1987 and assumed the presidency. The new constitution renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) as the Republic of Afghanistan (ROA) and adopted a multi-party government system with Islamic tenets as the legal basis of governance. The following year the Afghan Communist Party, the PDPA, changed name to the Hezb-e Watan (Homeland Party) and non-Communists were brought into the government.

Meanwhile the UN mediator, Diego Cordovez, made efforts through contacts with all the stake holders to win support for the formation of a coalition post-Soviet government, pending elections in the future, through mechanisms acceptable to all parties including convening a Loya Jirga which was promoted by the former King and his supporters. On the other hand the Soviet senior diplomat Yuli Vorontsov, the first deputy foreign minister (1986-1990) who in 1988-1989 doubled as Ambassador in Kabul, made the rounds talking to Mujahedin leaders and other stake holders to get support for the peaceful transition in Afghanistan through the formation of a coalition government with the participation of the Kabul regime and the Mujahedin factions.

Neither of these efforts succeeded in reconciling the competing demands of Kabul, the divided Mujahedin factions and the neighboring countries. The Mujahedin and their foreign backers felt that, with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the Kabul regime would immediately collapse and had little interest in entering into a deal with Kabul or Moscow for anything less than taking over the government. At the same time, Pakistan was keen on seeing the Kabul regime fall to the pro-Islamabad fundamentalist Mujahedin parties particularly the Hezb-e Islami of Hekmatyar in order to ensure Pakistan’s enduring influence in post-Communist Afghanistan.

All this time, the Soviet Union had to allay the concerns of their Afghan comrades about the risks of the Soviet pullout to the survival of the Kabul regime. But Moscow had made its decision and made arrangements to supply the Afghan security forces with sufficient arms and equipment to withstand the post-Soviet security threats. At the same time, the Kabul regime and Soviet intelligence exploited the division among the Afghan Mujahedin parties to pit them against each other and co-opt the Mujahedin field commanders. During the next two years an increasing number of Mujahedin major commanders made unwritten protocols with the regime and remained on the payroll of the Kabul government.[14]

In early April 1988, just days before the signing of the Geneva Accords and weeks before the beginning of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the entire stockpile of arms and ammunition for the Afghan war held at the ISI camp at Ojhri near Rawalpindi was destroyed. A spectacular explosion demolished the entire 10,000 ton store including 3,000 rockets, thousands of mortar bombs, millions of rounds of small arms ammunition, large numbers of anti-tank mines, recoilless rifle ammunition and Stinger missiles. The explosion killed 100 people and wounded over 1000. The sudden fireworks sent rockets and shells flying as far as 12 miles around the Rawalpindi-Islamabad twin cities and caused major chaos.[15] If the explosion was planned and carried out by anti-Mujahedin forces it was a master-stroke on the eve of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces.

The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on time and was conducted along two corridors – the eastern corridor of Ghazni-Gardez-Kabul-Pul-e Khomri-Termez to the Soviet Uzbekistan border and the western corridor that stretched from Kandahar-Shindand-Herat to Kushka on the Soviet Turkmenistan border. Prior to the official date of the withdrawal, in April-May 1988, troops from outlying garrisons including Asadabad in Kunar, Jabal Seraj-Gulbahar in Parwan, Bamian, Baraki-Barak in Logar, Cheghcheran (Now Feroz-Koh), in Ghor and Shahjui in Zabul were withdrawn to their parent regiments/brigades and divisions. The first phase began on May 15 and lasted three months during which some 50,000 troops (about 50% of all) left home from nine major garrisons. This ended the presence of Soviet troops in Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Gardez in the east, Lashkargah and Kandahar in the west and Faizabad and Kunduz in the northeast.[16] In this phase the combat support and combat service support units in Kabul were also withdrawn.[17] The second and final phase of the withdrawal began in December 1988 and ended on February 15, 1989 when all elements of the 40th army returned home. During the withdrawing process the Soviet army transferred part of its arms and equipment to the Afghan army. The total troops withdrawn included 110,000 personnel, 500 tanks, 4000 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (BMPs) and armored personnel carriers (BTR), 2,000 artillery pieces and mortars and 16,000 trucks.

The withdrawal was planned and ran with full security measures as more than 150,000 Mujahedin controlled 80% of the territory. Security was particularly crucial on the Salang highway which was under threat from Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Mujahedin. The Soviet command struck a deal with Massoud for the safe passage of its troops. The deal, however, was later broken by the Soviets due to Najibullah’s insistence on attacking and weakening the Mujahedin before the Soviet troops left the country.[18] Gromov later admitted that during the preparation for withdrawal, he did not follow orders from Moscow Headquarters to fire on field commanders. The Soviet command had an unpublicized agreement of neutrality with these commanders during the withdrawal. Gromov ordered his troops to fire upon unoccupied ravines, so as to avoid any serious bloodshed. According to Russian General Staff accounts, in order to ensure the organized and safe march of the retrograding forces, withdrawal routes were divided into 120-150 kilometers stretches which was a day’s motor march, At the end of every stretch, the march column would concentrate into a prepared bivouac site which was prepared for defense with dug in positions for tanks and BMPs. The site was protected by minefields. The stationary guards lined the route while army aviation supported the marching unit. For example, 74 sorties were launched by the air force on August 5 in the Kandahar region. They made 37 bombing and strafing attacks. Meanwhile the engineer detachments were removing mines.[19]

(Excerpts from Ali A Jalali’s “A Military History of Afghanistan from the Great Game to the Global War on Terror, University Pess of Knsas, 2017.”

[1] Lyakhovsky, pp. 176-177

[2] Ibid. Also Braithwaite, pp. 270-271; Cordovez and Harrison

[3] Braithwaite, p. 271

[4] Bradsher, Afghan Communism and the Soviet Intervention, p. 171, cited in Mitrokhin et all, p. 413

[5] The Soviet Union and Afghanistan 1878-1989: Documents,”P.180. cited in Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 413

[6] Mary C. FitzGerald, Marshal Ogarkov and the New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, Naval Warfare Operations Division, Hudson Institute, Center for Naval Analysis Alexandria, Virginia, January 1987, p. 8

[7] Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall, Yale University Press 2011, p. 341

[8] Gorbachev, Mikhail, Memoirs, Doubleday, New York, 1996, p. 171

[9] Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 415

[10] Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp.442-3, cited in Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 416

[11] Ibid, p. 217

[12] The Geneva Accords, 14 April 1988

[13] See Consolidate Report of the Office of the United Nations Co-ordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs Relating to Afghanistan, Geneva, September 1988, p 60-64

[14] Author’s interview with several former KHAD officials and former Mujahedin commanders in Kabul in 2003, 2006 and 2014

[15] Yusaf and Adkin, p. 220

[16] Gromov , p. 307

[17] For the details of the withdrawal see the valuable study of Dr. Lester Grau: Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos – the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/withdrawal.pdf

[18] Ibid.

[19] The Russian General Staff, p. 88